

















Muslim	 schools	 under	 New	 Labour	 and	 the	 subsequent	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	
governments	and	compares	how	these	narratives	align	with	outcomes	in	terms	of	numbers	
of,	and	types	of,	denominational	Muslim	faith	schools	in	Britain.	The	article	applies	a	Critical	
Race	 Theory	 approach	 based	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 counter-narrative	 through	 a	 critical	
analysis	 of	 policy	 and	 its	 outcomes.	 This	 analysis	 is	 contextualised	 through	 exploring	 the	
implications	 of	 counter-terror	 strategies	 such	 as	 Prevent	 for	 the	 political	 and	 educational	
equity	of	British	Muslims	as	stakeholders	in	the	state.	Against	this	context	the	article	explores	
the	 extent	 to	 which	 successive	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 political	 narratives	 around	 faith	
schooling	have	played	out	in	terms	of	denominational	state-funded	Muslim	schools.	Whilst	
gains	 have	 been	made	 under	 New	 Labour	 and	 the	 successive	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	






















Conservative	 (2015-date)	governments	 line	up	with	outcomes	 in	 terms	of	 the	numbers	of	
Muslim	schools	that	have	been	granted	state	funding	since	1998.	The	article	aims	to	explore	
some	of	 the	 implications	of	 the	role	of	Muslim	schools	 in	 the	political	enfranchisement	of	
British	Muslim	communities.	It	is	argued	that	Islamic	schools	represent	a	key	site	for	British	
Muslims	 to	 acquire	 political	 equity	 in	 a	wider	 climate	 that	 embodies,	 to	 varying	 degrees,	

















Establishing	 boundaries	 for	 the	 enquiry	 –	 Critical	 Race	 Theory	 and	 its	
application	in	this	enquiry	
This	article	 is	 focused	on	applying	a	CRT	analysis	of	 the	disparity	between	 (a)	educational	
policy	rhetoric	around	faith	schooling	generally	and	Muslim	schools	specifically	since	1997,	










of	 other	 emerging	work	 by	 this	 author.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 the	 rationale	 for	














2005,	2008).	To	 this	end	 the	enquiry	here	 is	 informed	by	a	critical	 consideration	of	public	
policy	and	rhetoric	around	 faith	schooling	since	1997	with	a	view	to	comparing	narratives	
around	Muslim	schools	in	the	political	and	public	space	with	outcomes.	A	recurring	theme	in	










restrictive	 and	 at	 worst	 problematic.	 The	 safest	 option	might	 be	 to	 simply	 focus	 on	 one	
particular	ethnic	group	within	the	wider	religious	community	of	British	Muslims.	In	many	ways	





















the	 years	 following	 11	 September	 2001	 and	 the	 London	 bombings	 of	 2005.	 It	 is	 fully	
acknowledged	here	that	there	is	much	critical	discussion	around	Islamophobia	and	what	it	
means	 at	 the	 conceptual	 level.	 There	 is	 not	 the	 scope	 to	 substantively	 replicate	 these	










Islam.	The	 first	of	 these	closed	views	 is	 the	perception	of	 Islam	as	being	 seen	as	a	 ‘single	
monolithic	 bloc,	 static	 and	 unresponsive	 to	 new	 realities’	 (Runnymede	 1997,	 5).	 The	
overtones	here	are	twofold.	Firstly,	Islam	is	presented	as	homogenous	rather	than	diverse.	
Secondly,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	Muslim	communities	are	unresponsive	 to	change.	 If	Muslim	
communities	are	perceived	of	as	being	unresponsive	to	change,	then	the	implication	here	is	




suggest	 a	 homogenised	 notion	 of	 Islamophobia	 which	 does	 not	 effectively	 allow	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 the	 many	 nuanced	 and	 varied	 ways	 in	 which	 anti-Muslim	 and	 anti-Islamic	
phenomena	might	occur	(Allen	2010,	55).	Thus,	if	we	are	confined	to	identifying	Islamophobia	




























Whilst	 not	 exclusively	 the	 case,	 racism	 within	 a	 CRT	 framework	 certainly	 includes	 the	
acknowledgement	of	 racist	outcomes	without	 the	necessary	presence	of	active	 racists.	As	
noted	above,	a	key	part	of	the	CRT	argument	is	that	racism	has	become	so	nuanced	that	it	






culture,	 history	 and	 territories	which	were	 used	 to	 group	 fabricated	 distinctions	 between	
‘Europeanness’	 and	 ‘non-Europeanness’	 (Sayyid	 2010,	 13).	 For	 Sayyid,	 Islamophobia	 can	
arguably	be	defined	as	the	disciplining	of	Muslims	by	reference	to	an	antagonistic	‘Western’	




political	 enfranchisement	 of	 British	 Muslims	 in	 the	 public	 space	 more	 generally,	 before	




One	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 Muslims	 have	 been	 displaced	 as	 stakeholders	 in	















centred’	 focus	 within	 strategies	 like	 Prevent	 functions	 as	 something	 of	 a	 self-defeating	






allocation	of	 funding	within	this	Muslim-specific	approach	has	the	potential	 to	 fuel	White,	
working-class	resentment,	whilst	leaving	some	Muslims	feeling	that	they	have	been	targeted	
as	a	result	of	broad,	negative	generalisations	about	their	communities	(Thomas	2009,	285,	
286).	But	 there	are	wider	 issues	here	with	 the	ways	 in	which	 funding	has	been	allocated.	















clarifying	 any	 possible	 genuine	 threat’	 (Fekete	 2004,	 9).	 Fekete’s	 concept	 of	 anti-Muslim	
racism	goes	beyond	simply	 identifying	 that	Muslims	experience	 racialisation	as	a	 result	of	
political	narratives	around	the	‘war	on	terror’.	Rather,	anti-Muslim	racism	is	organised	and	
operates	discursively.	Fekete	argues	that	intelligence	services,	police	and	the	media	work	in	
conjunction	with	a	political	agenda	centred	around	eliciting	public	 consent	 to	 surveillance	
through	the	evocation	of	fear,	to	create	a	culture	of	suspicion	against	Muslims	(Fekete	2004,	








orientation.	 Counter-terrorist	 strategies	 provide	 a	 normative	 base	 from	 which	 these	





consistently	 avoid	 applying	 the	 term	 ‘violent	 extremism’	 to	 any	other	 ethnic,	 or	 religious,	
group	(Thomas	2009,	284).	The	Muslim-centred	focus	within	Prevent	in	particular	results	in	
an	 agenda	 which	 claims	 even-handedness,	 but	 allows	 the	 continuing	 development	 of	
organisations	 like	 the	 British	 National	 Party	 (Thomas	 2009,	 286)	 and	 the	 English	 Defence	
League.	These	kinds	of	public	narratives	result	in	Muslim	political	voices	being	subjected	to	a	
filtration	 process	which	 has	 the	 power	 to	 displace	 particular	 political	 interests	 outside	 of	
mainstream	 democratic	 discussion.	 The	 inability	 for	 counter-terrorism	 strategies	 to	
effectively	 differentiate	 Muslim	 political	 dissidents	 indicates	 that	 these	 strategies	
homogenise	Muslims	based	on	the	kind	of	‘closed	views’	of	Islam	identified	by	Runnymede	in	





As	 noted	 above,	 such	 counter-terror	 strategies	 have	massive	 implications	 for	 the	political	
marginalisation	 of	 British	 Muslim	 voices	 owing	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 conflating	 Muslim	 political	
dissidents	with	Islamic	extremists.	However,	the	political	marginalisation	of	British	Muslims	
also	 happens	 at	 a	 far	more	 subtle	 level	 and	 this	 is	 inherently	 embedded	 in	 conventional	
notions	of	‘race’	which	exclude	religious	identity	as	a	legitimate	facet.	As	argued	by	Meer	&	







sees	 Muslims	 as	 a	 threat	 rather	 than	 a	 disadvantaged	 minority	 subject	 to	 increasingly	
pernicious	discourses	of	racialisation	(Meer	and	Modood	2009,	354).	Whilst	the	kinds	of	anti-
Muslim	sentiment	outlined	by	Meer	&	Modood	may	have	their	roots	in	notions	of	cultural	
racism,	 anti-Muslim	 sentiment	 also	 has	 fundamental	 implications	 for	 the	 political	
disenfranchisement	of	British	Muslims.	Anti-Muslim	racism	may	well	have	its	roots	in	notions	
of	cultural	racism	centred	around	identifying	‘good’	and	‘bad’	South	Asians	as	identified	by	






democratic	politics.	 The	Prevent	 strategy	and	 its	appendages	 (most	 recently	 the	 statutory	
duty	 for	 schools	 to	 prevent	 violent	 extremism)	manifest	 a	 bridging	 gap	 between	 political	
equity	and	education	 indicating	a	wider	 culture	of	 surveillance	around	Muslim	children	 in	
schools.	This	is	bound	into	wider	public	narratives	around	the	conflating	of	increased	Islamic	
influence	 with	 legitimate	 threat.	 This	 binary	 reading	 of	 the	 Islamic	 in	 the	 public	 space	
completely	overlooks	one	of	the	key	functions	of	Muslim	schools	as	identified	in	the	voices	of	
stakeholders	 in	 Islamic	 schools	 in	Meer’s	 research	 (2009).	Meer	 cites	 Abdullah	 Trevathan	
(head	 of	 the	 Islamia	 school	 in	 Brent)	 as	 explicitly	 stating	 in	 an	 interview	 that	 part	 of	 the	
purpose	of	Muslim	schools	is	to	create	an	emerging	British	Muslim	culture,	rather	than	the	
conservation	 of	 any	 pre-existing	 culture	 (Meer	 2009,	 383).	 In	 this	 particular	 instance,	 the	
increased	presence	of	the	Islamic	 in	the	public	sphere	that	necessarily	comes	with	Muslim	




Muslim	 schools	 have	 been	 present	 in	 England	 and	Wales	 since	 1979	 (Dooley	 1991).	 It	 is	
important	to	establish	here	that,	whilst	many	Muslim	children	receive	supplementary	Islamic	
education	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 Madrassas	 in	 community	 Mosques,	 this	 paper	 is	
concerned	 with	 those	 institutions	 which	 are	 registered	 as	 Muslim	 schools	 either	 in	 the	
independent	or	state-maintained	sector	in	England	and	Wales.	Within	the	frameworks	around	
state-maintained	 education,	 particular	 types	 of	 schools	 are	 able	 to	 identify	 as	 having	 a	
‘distinctive	religious	character’.	There	are	two	important	timeframes	to	consider	here	with	





to	 identify	 themselves	 as	 having	 a	 ‘distinctive	 religious	 character’	 whilst	 providing	
denominational	Religious	Education	(RE)	in	line	with	their	religious	character.	Arrangements	
for	 funding	 represent	an	 important	distinguishing	 feature	of	voluntary-aided	schools,	with	















Act	 first	 introduced	frameworks	which	would	allow	 independent	 faith	schools	to	apply	 for	
funding	 directly	 through	 central	 government.	 Under	 these	 frameworks,	 regulation	 of	 the	
school	would	also	come	directly	 from	central	government	 rather	 than	 the	 local	education	
authority.	This	process	would	position	independent	faith	schools	successful	in	securing	grant-
maintained	 status	 outside	 of	 any	 local	 communities	 of	 voluntary-aided	 faith	 schools.	









The	 apparent	 interest	 in	 funding	 minority	 religious	 schools	 more	 generally,	 and	 Muslim	
schools	specifically,	was	manifested	in	a	series	of	parliamentary	papers	and	public	documents	
under	 New	 Labour.	 For	 example,	 the	 2001	 Green	 Paper	 Schools	 building	 on	 success	
emphasised	that	faith	schools	appear	to	perform	well	when	compared	to	non-denominational	
schools,	and	subsequently	proposed	expanding	faith-schooling	within	the	state	sector	(DfEE	
2001).	 In	 2005,	 the	 White	 Paper	 Higher	 standards,	 better	 schools	 for	 all	 continued	 this	
narrative	 by	 further	 encouraging	 independent	 schools	 to	 join	 the	 state	 sector,	 with	 a	
particular	emphasis	on	encouraging	Muslim	schools	to	apply	for	voluntary-aided	status	(UK	
Government	 2005).	 Furthermore,	 in	 September	 2007	 the	 government,	 along	 with	
representatives	of	major	faith	groups,	released	the	document	Faith	in	the	system.	The	paper	
‘unveiled	a	joint	declaration	and	shared	vision	of	schools	with	a	religious	character	in	twenty-







particular	 religious	 character	 and	 that	 the	 availability	 of	 places	 in	 the	maintained	





(Breen	 2013).	 New	 Labour’s	 sustained	 policy	 narratives	 around	 encouraging	 the	





2015	 has	 provided	 for	 a	 confused	 picture	 regarding	 the	 government’s	 position	 on	 faith	
schools.	The	political	landscape	since	2010	has	been	complex,	with	a	series	of	developments	
leaving	 the	 future	of	minority	 faith	 schooling	open	 to	question.	Almost	 immediately	 after	
securing	office	as	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	declared	 that	 ‘state	multiculturalism	has	
failed’	(Helm,	Taylor,	and	Davis	2011),	a	statement	that	necessarily	brings	into	question	the	
issue	 of	whether	 or	 not	 the	 state	will	 continue	 to	 encourage	 faith	 schooling	 for	minority	
communities.	However,	the	wider	implications	of	the	change	in	government	in	2010	for	state-
funded	faith	schools	generally,	and	Muslim	schools	specifically,	are	far	from	clear.	One	key	
development	 in	 education	 policy	 came	 with	 the	 Academies	 Act	 of	 2010	 which	 laid	 the	
foundation	for	the	widespread	‘conversion’	of	state	schools	to	academy	status,	including	vast	
swathes	of	voluntary-aided	schools.	The	Academies	Act	also	set	out	the	frameworks	around	






that	 it	 is	multiculturalism	 as	 an	 institutionalised	 strategy,	 advocated	 in	 the	 Swann	Report	
(1985),	that	has	failed.	As	an	institutional	strategy	‘state	multiculturalism’	has	been	criticised	
for	lacking	clear	guidelines	and	national	leadership	(Parekh	2000),	and	consequently	failing	to	
effectively	 embody	 the	 conceptual	 premises	 of	 ‘multiculturalism’	 as	 a	 conceptual	 tool	 for	
challenging	 ‘race’	 inequality	 (see	 Meer	 and	 Modood	 2009;	 Modood	 1994,	 1998,	 2008;	
Modood	 and	 Werbner	 1997).	 However,	 the	 declaration	 that	 multiculturalism	 has	 failed	
represents	 only	 one	 example	 of	 the	 wider	 revival	 of	 assimilationist	 discourses	 around	
education	following	the	events	of	11	September	2001,	the	2001	riots	in	the	North	of	England	
and	 the	 London	 bombings	 of	 7	 July	 2005	 (Sian	 2015,	 183).	 Evidence	 of	 the	 revival	 of	
assimilationist	 discourses	 around	 education	 has	 most	 recently	 been	 revealed	 with	 the	






British	values	 in	 the	public	sphere.	Such	concerns	about	 increased	 Islamic	 influence	 in	 the	
















Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 state	 sector.	 The	 question	 around	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Muslim	




their	 existing	 status	 in	 a	 competitive	 and	 transformative	 education	 market	 against	 the	
possible	benefits	of	 converting	 to	academy	status	 (Meer	and	Breen	 forthcoming).	Existing	











Coalition	 and	 subsequent	 Conservative	 governments,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 establish	 how	 far	
Muslim	communities	have	been	enfranchised	 through	 state	 funding	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	
date.	Furthermore,	it	is	crucially	important	to	consider	the	ways	in	which	any	gains	have	been	
made	and	the	nature	of	the	partnerships	that	they	represent.	The	discussion	in	the	previous	
subsection	 might	 appear	 to	 champion	 multiculturalism	 due	 to	 ways	 in	 which	 state-
multiculturalism	 has	 informed	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 enfranchising	 Muslim	 communities	
through	state	funding	for	Islamic	schools.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	the	establishment	
of	 state-funded	 Muslim	 schools	 under	 New	 Labour	 did	 represent	 a	 watershed	 in	 the	
educational	enfranchisement	of	British	Muslims.	Particularly,	 the	establishment	of	Muslim	


















Roman	Catholic	 (Tinker	2009,	540).	Within	 this	number,	53	voluntary-aided	 schools	had	a	
distinctive	religious	character	other	than	C	of	E	or	Roman	Catholic	(Tinker	2009,	540).	Breaking	





significant	 step	 forwards	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 educational	 enfranchisement	 of	 British	Muslims.	






Whilst	 the	 above	 starts	 to	 reveal	 just	 how	 few	 British	 Muslims	 have	 had	 the	 benefit	 of	
attending	 a	 voluntary-aided	 Muslim	 school,	 a	 crucially	 important	 point	 needs	 to	 be	























state-funded	 Christian	 and	 Muslim	 provision.	 Clearly,	 educational	 provision	 for	 Christian	
schools	is	predominantly	provided	for	within	the	state	sector,	whereas	provision	for	Muslim	
schooling	 is	 predominantly	 provided	 for	 within	 the	 independent	 sector.	 It	 might	 not	 be	
realistic	to	expect	to	see	Muslim	communities	having	the	same	proportional	access	within	








and	 the	 outcomes	 that	 British	 Muslims	 have	 subsequently	 acquired	 reflects	 a	 legacy	 of	
struggle	 faced	 by	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 seeking	 to	 acquire	 state	 funding.	 Whilst	
Muslim	schools	have	been	active	in	the	pursuit	of	state	funding	as	early	as	1983	(see	Tinker	
2009,	540),	 it	 is	1998	before	we	see	 the	 first	 state-funded	Muslim	schools	 in	England	and	
Wales.	 An	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 offered	by	Walford,	who	 argues	 that	 strict	 financial	 and	
demand-led	criteria	imposed	at	the	time	made	it	difficult	for	evangelical	Christian	schools	and	
















took	place	under	New	Labour.	Whilst	 this	 is	only	one	documented	case,	 it	 is	 important	 in	






to	be	progressive,	able	 to	commend	themselves	on	offering	 the	 first	 state-funded	Muslim	




The	disparity	between	policy	 rhetoric	 and	outcomes	 in	 terms	of	numbers	of	 state-funded	
Muslim	schools	under	New	Labour	played	out	in	the	form	of	marginal	gains	in	the	state	sector	
for	 British	 Muslims.	 However,	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Coalition	 government	 in	 2010	 and	 the	
subsequent	Conservative	government	of	2015	represents	something	of	a	game	changer	 in	
terms	of	how	policy	plays	out	for	stakeholders	in	Islamic	schooling.	As	demonstrated	above,	
the	 landscape	 of	 state-funded	 Islamic	 schooling	 between	 1998	 and	 2010	 was	 largely	
characterised	 by	 slow-paced	 and	 hard-fought	 gains	 being	 secured	 through	 the	 voluntary-
aided	system	(Meer	and	Breen,	forthcoming).	Demand	for	Muslim	schools	also	appears	to	be	
on	 the	 increase	with	 numbers	 of	 independent	Muslim	 schools	 seemingly	 rising.	 As	 noted	
above,	 numbers	 of	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 around	 2009–2013	 were	 estimated	 at	





objectively	 that	 numbers	 of	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 have	 risen	 by	 38	 since	 2009.	















made	 through	 the	 new	 and	 emergent	 frameworks	 around	 free	 schools.	 Currently,	 the	
landscape	of	state-funded	Muslim	schooling	comprises	12	voluntary-aided	schools,	eight	free	
schools	and	one	academy	(AMS	data	as	of	October	2014).	Although	the	number	of	voluntary-
aided	Muslim	schools	has	remained	at	12	since	2009,	 it	 is	 important	to	point	out	that	the	
single	Muslim	academy	was	previously	operational	in	the	voluntary-aided	sector.	This	means	
that	at	some	point	following	the	Academies	Act	(2010)	one	voluntary-aided	Muslim	school	
made	 the	 transition	 to	 academy	 status	 leaving	 11	Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 voluntary-aided	
sector.	Given	 that	 the	number	 currently	 stands	at	12,	 this	 suggests	 that	one	 independent	
Muslim	school	has	successfully	entered	voluntary-aided	sector	since	2010.	 It	 is	also	worth	
identifying	a	further	point	of	clarity	here,	in	that	many	independent	Muslim	schools	use	the	










it	 seems	 that	 objective	 economic	 enfranchisement	 has	 been	 on	 the	 rise	 for	 Muslim	
communities	 seeking	 state	 funding	 for	 their	 faith	 schools,	 deconstructing	 the	 structures	
around	free	schools	 reveals	something	of	a	counter-narrative	 in	 the	CRT	sense.	An	overall	
increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 state-funded	Muslim	 free	 schools	 since	 2010	might	 appear	 to	











of	 local	 authority	 control	 and	 as	 such	 are	 answerable	 only	 to	 central	 government	 as	 do	
academies.	Trends	discussed	above	demonstrate	that	voluntary-aided	schools	are	slowly	but	
surely	 converting	 to	 academy	 status	 and	 so	 the	 role	 of	 local	 government	 in	 educational	
provision	 is	 steadily	 changing.	 Whilst	 these	 developments	 are	 presented	 in	 ways	 which	
highlight	the	‘freedoms’	afforded	by	stepping	out	of	local	government	control,	in	reality	any	
liberation	is	afforded	at	the	cost	of	massively	increased	individual	accountability	for	schools.	
The	 2010	 Act	 arguably	 represents	 the	manifestation	 of	 uber	 neoliberal	 principles	 around	
education	and	 the	shifting	of	accountability	 for	 its	provision	away	 from	 local	government.	
However,	of	 crucial	 importance	here,	 the	nature	of	 the	 relationship	between	 schools	 and	






A	 clear	 example	 of	 this	 can	 be	 seen	with	 the	ways	 in	which	media	 narratives	 have	 been	
constructed	 around	 the	 Al-Madinah	 free	 school	 in	 Derby,	 UK.	 Since	 the	 advent	 of	 the	
Academies	Act	 (2010)	and	 the	Coalition’s	 commitment	 to	advocating	academies	and	 ‘free	











2012	as	 the	 first	Muslim	 free	 school	 to	offer	provision	at	nursery,	primary	and	 secondary	
levels.	The	school	was	investigated	for	‘financial	irregularities’	in	August	2013,	and	an	OFSTED	
report	which	 followed	 raised	 further	 concerns	 about	 the	 school	 (BBC	 2013).	Much	media	
speculation	has	been	generated	around	the	nature	of	the	concerns	raised	by	OFSTED,	with	





Al-Madinah.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	concerned	with	 the	contextual	points	of	 reference	which	
have	 been	 used	 in	 media	 discussions.	 The	 problems	 which	 have	 been	 raised	 have	 been	
consistently	attributed	to	the	school’s	faith	character,	rather	than	its	position	as	a	free	school	
operating	within	new	and	emergent	educational	structures.	At	least	one	other	free	school	has	
also	 faced	 closure	 in	 the	 ‘Discovery’	 school	 in	 Crawley	 (Adams	 2013),	whilst	 funding	was	
pulled	from	the	‘One	in	a	Million’	free	school	in	Bradford	nine	days	before	it	was	due	to	open	
(Beckett	2012).	This	evidence	demonstrates	that	there	have	been	systemic	problems	with	the	




school	demonstrates	a	 clear	necessity	 for	greater	dialogue	between	communities	and	 the	
state.	 Communities	may	be	 free	 to	 found	 schools	which	 serve	 local	 needs,	 but	under	 the	
structures	 around	 free	 schools	 they	 are	 also	 positioned	 as	 ultimately	 accountable	 should	
problems	 occur.	 Given	 that	 Muslim	 schools	 have	 largely	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 state-
maintained	 sector,	 prior	 experience	 and	 expertise	 around	 providing	 mainstream	 faith	
schooling	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 present	within	 communities	 looking	 to	 establish	 Islamic	 free	
schools.	 In	 many	 senses,	 the	 structures	 around	 free	 schooling	 seem	 to	 be	 too	 ‘free’.	
Responsibility	for	any	issues	of	concern	is	instantly	attributed	to	the	school,	rather	than	the	
absence	of	support	and	guidance	from	the	state.	Thus,	whilst	Muslim	communities	might	be	
making	 objective	 gains,	 the	 structures	 around	 free	 schools	 leave	 these	 communities	
vulnerable	 to	 public	 criticism	 and	 Islamophobic	 media	 narratives	 where	 the	 mechanisms	





a	 more	 serious	 issue	 here.	 The	 uber-neoliberal	 foundations	 which	 underpin	 free	 schools	
represent	 the	 epitome	 of	 passivity	 to	 Islamophobic	 discourses	 which	 demarcate	 the	
boundaries	 of	 possibilities	 for	 expanding	 mainstream	 British	 Islamic	 schools	 for	 Muslim	












reality	 the	 political	 voices	 of	 Muslims	 are	 constrained.	 Counter-terror	 strategies	 work	 in	
conjunction	with	media	narratives	around	the	‘war	on	terror’	to	ensure	that	being	Muslim	
and	 speaking	out	 against	 the	 state	 carries	with	 it	 the	 risk	of	being	 labelled	as	 a	 threat	 to	
national	 security.	 This	 wider	 climate	 has	 permeated	 education	 through	 particular	







The	 second	 key	 point	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 argument	 is	 that	 state-funded	Muslim	 schools	
represent	 important	 opportunities	 for	 the	 state	 to	 acknowledge	 and	 redress	 the	 wider	
political	and	educational	inequity	experienced	by	British	Muslims	through	actively	entering	
into	 partnerships	 with	Muslim	 communities.	 Progress	 in	 the	 1998–2010	 period	was	 slow	
enough	to	raise	questions	about	how	far	New	Labour	actually	were	interested	in	increasing	
numbers	 of	 state	Muslim	 schools.	 However,	 for	 those	 that	were	 successful,	 the	 resulting	
voluntary-aided	schools	represented	more	of	a	partnership	between	local	government	and	
communities	 than	those	currently	offered	through	 free	schooling,	and	allowed	 (at	 least	 in	
principle)	 for	 schools	 to	 seek	 support	 and	 guidance	 where	 needed	 as	 part	 of	 a	 localised	
network	of	institutions.	Whilst	numbers	of	Muslim	free	schools	have	increased	in	the	post-
2010	 era,	 state	 involvement	 in	 these	 partnerships	 is	minimal.	 The	 argument	 here	 is	 that	
increasing	the	numbers	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	at	all	represents	an	important	step	in	
increasing	 the	 educational	 enfranchisement,	 and	 by	 proxy	 the	 political	 equity,	 of	 British	
Muslims.	However,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	power	dynamics	around	responsibility	and	
accountability	manifested	in	the	new	and	emergent	mechanisms	around	free	schools	and	the	
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